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We live in an age of disruption. For technologists and venture
capitalists, these are happy days. “Disruptive innovations,” typically
digital in nature, create new markets and value chains that grow and
overthrow market leaders and other incumbents. Think personal
computing, cell phones, Über, or, in the era our park system was
founded, the mass production automobile. 1 Disruption has become so
sexy lately that capital and culture essentially flow away from anything
not promising to disrupt something. The founders of our National Park
System and National Park Service (NPS) had little sense of such
disruption and, judging by how our park ideals have fared in recent
decades, too little sense of how disruption works in nature, either. This is
not to attribute (anachronistically) some single, comprehensive view of

* Joseph H. Goldstein Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Penn State University.
1. See, e.g., CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW
TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997).
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nature to the Park System’s creators. 2 It is rather to suggest that the
parks embody a set of ideals and, as one of the most noted inventions of
America’s democracy, sit in uneasy tension with the constant disruption
of nature’s composition and function. That should snap our centennial
into a perspective—one which this essay urges NPS leaders to
internalize as fully and quickly as possible.
We have long suspected that climate disruption will mean even
more risk to the park system’s “crown jewels.” 3 This essay introduces
the legal and technical challenge that disruption of the parks is bringing
NPS, and suggests some paths along which NPS may find a renewed
approach to park system governance and transparency. Part I introduces
the legislation undergirding NPS management of the park system. Part II
explains the key mandate: that the parks be maintained unimpaired for
future generations. Part III describes a new normal in this nonimpairment work: the predominance of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). Finally, Part IV makes some suggestions about NPS
priorities and adaptation to its second century, especially in light of its
resource constraints. Ultimately, it may be the disruptive innovator’s
strategy of avoiding an incumbent’s advantages, rather than outcompeting them, that NPS must adopt.
I. THE PARK SYSTEM AND NEPA: A FUSION
NPS is obliged by its Organic Act of 1916 to “conserve the scenery
and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to
provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
generations.” 4 In 1970, Congress added to that mandate with what it
2. The famed creation myth of our park ideal—where it supposedly materialized one night,
in a campfire debate in 1870 just up-slope from the Firehole River (as now memorialized
throughout Yellowstone)—has been more heroic metaphor than historical fact. See PAUL
SCHULLERY & LEE WHITTLESEY, MYTH AND HISTORY IN THE CREATION OF YELLOWSTONE
NATIONAL PARK (2003).
3. See, e.g., STEPHEN SAUNDERS ET AL., NATIONAL PARKS IN PERIL: THE THREATS OF
CLIMATE DISRUPTION (2009).
4. National Parks Service and Related Programs Enactment, Pub. L. No. 113-287, 128 Stat.
3094 (repealing and re-enacting An Act to Establish a National Park Service and for Other
Purposes, 39 Stat. 535 (1916), codified at 54 U.S.C. § 100101 (2014). The full passage (from the
original Organic Act) is as follows:
The Secretary, acting through the Director of the National Park Service, shall promote and regulate the use of the National Park System by means and measures that
conform to the fundamental purpose of the System units, which purpose is to conserve the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life in the System units and
to provide for the enjoyment of the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild
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styled a “General Authorities Act,” announcing that all of the parks:
though distinct in character, are united through their inter-related purposes and resources into one national park system as cumulative expressions of a single national heritage . . . and that it is the purpose of
this Act to include all such areas in the System and to clarify the authorities applicable to the system. 5

A 1978 statute enacted in connection with amendments to Redwood
National Park’s organizing texts, provided that the parks’:
administration . . . shall be conducted in light of the high public value
and integrity of the National Park System and not be exercised in derogation of the values and purposes for which these various areas have
been established, except as may have been or shall be directly and specifically provided by Congress. 6

Finally, in 1998 an omnibus reform bill overhauled concessions in the
parks and, at the same time, nudged NPS to cultivate the science culture
it had to that point lacked. 7
But to what extent did these mandates actually unite the parks
legally, culturally, or practically? The centennial year 2016, after all,
marked the occasion the Supreme Court held that a hovercraft-piloting
moose hunter in Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve could ignore
the NPS’s regulations banning hovercraft from national preserves on
account of a unit-establishing statute, the Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act (ANILCA), vesting the State of Alaska with
jurisdiction over rivers within NPS units therein. 8 In short, the legal,
cultural, and practical obstacles to the system being a true system
remain, and they are formidable.
One influence that has grown steadily over the last four decades
life in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.
Id. Embedded within the “non-impairment” mandate, is NPS’s correlative duty to “promote” the use
of the park system, a correlate some have argued qualifies the non-impairment mandate
substantially. See, e.g., William C. Tweed, An Idea in Trouble: Thoughts About the Future of
Traditional National Parks in the United States, 27 GEO. WRIGHT F. 6, 12 (2010).
5. Pub. L. No. 91-383, 84 Stat. 825 (1970), codified at 54 U.S.C. § 100101(b)(1)(B) (2014).
6. Pub. L. No. 92-250, § 101(b), 92 Stat. 163, 166 (1978), codified at 54 U.S.C. § 100101.
Congress enacted these amendments (known as the “Redwood Amendment”) in response to a series
of NPS policy determinations purporting to categorize the park system into different tiers of
access/enjoyment and preservation emphases. See NRA v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903, 905-07 (D.D.C.
1986); Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202, 204-05 (6th Cir. 1991).
7. On the missing science culture of NPS, see RICHARD WEST SELLARS, PRESERVING
NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS: A HISTORY (1997).
8. See Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061 (2016).
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which promises to continue growing is the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). This national “charter” for the environment has
become the go-to tool of anyone opposing governmental action. Indeed,
NPS has found itself the target of such efforts routinely. NPS is a repeatplay NEPA agency, though, generating significant percentages of the
three kinds of NEPA analyses produced annually: environmental impact
statements (EIS); 9 environmental assessments with findings of no
significant impact (EA/FONSI); and categorical exclusion
determinations (CATX). 10 Consequently, it is very much in the agency’s
interest to strategize and optimize its NEPA compliance routines. This
essay on the centennial traces the non-impairment standard’s growth
toward and into alignment with NEPA, a statute that shifted NPS
governance both substantively and procedurally and which, in an
increasingly climate-disrupted future, promises to become even more of
an influence on NPS’s authority and operations.
II. NON-IMPAIRMENT: A LEGAL MANDATE SUBMERGED IN
DISCRETION?
What does it mean to impair a national park for future generations
contrary to the Organic Act? What did it mean to the legislators of the
63rd Congress? 11 Given the need for the Administrative Procedure Act’s
(APA) jurisdictional help when challenging NPS actions as contrary to
the non-impairment standard, 12 the ideal itself is often juxtaposed with
unimpeachable “discretion.” 13 As the Tenth Circuit once noted,
9. An EIS is required if the proposed major federal action may “significantly” affect the
quality of the human environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(a)(1), 1502.3.
10. From 1998-2010, according to data collected by the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ), NPS’s share of all EISs completed (the only type of NEPA document subject to any
nationwide inventory/collection requirement) averaged over 6%. Author calculations from data
released by CEQ, available at NEPA, https://ceq.doe.gov/current_developments/eis_filings.html.
Though no agency tallies its EA/FONSIs or CATX determinations, a stock estimate that has long
been in circulation is roughly ten EA/FONSIs for every one EIS. See Kern v. Bureau of Land
Management, 284 F.3d 1062, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002).
11. Cf. S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Dabney, 222 F.3d 819, 826 (10th Cir. 2000) (“It is unclear
from the statute itself what constitutes impairment, and how both the duration and severity of the
impairment are to be evaluated or weighed against the other value of public use of the park.”). If the
focus remains on the legislative currents leading to the Organic Act’s passage in 1916, impairment
is tied tightly to the scenic integrity of the parks. See Robin Winks, The National Park Service Act
of 1916: “A Contradictory Mandate”?, 74 Denv. U.L. Rev. 575 (1997).
12. Neither NEPA, the Organic Act, nor any of the 1970’s amendments include their own
cause of action. The APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity and right of review do so in tandem with
the general federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99,
105-07 (1977).
13. For example, in an otherwise exhaustively considered opinion scrutinizing NPS’s
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[n]either the word “unimpaired” nor the phrase “unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations” is defined in the Act. It is unclear from
the statute itself what constitutes impairment, and how both the duration and severity of the impairment are to be evaluated or weighed
against the other value of public use of the park. 14

The APA’s orthodox division of legal issues into questions of law, fact,
and discretion is amply communicated by the structure of its scope of
review provision, 5 U.S.C. § 706, with each issue-type paired to its own
standard(s) of review. 15 That means that as challenges to an agency’s
legal conclusions, factual findings, or discretionary judgments pursuant
to its enabling legislation mount, the precedential records thereof mount
as well. Indeed, our whole system of administrative law is oriented
against official discretion in this fashion. Most directly, it exposes
exercises of discretionary judgment to judicial scrutiny and the risk of
reversal either as a matter of decision-making procedure(s) or as a matter
of substantive rationality. 16 A bit more indirectly, the system of judicial
review, coupled with certain “action forcing” duties under NEPA §
102(2)(C), 17 prompts agencies like NPS to separate out the various
“factors” informing their decision-making, whether as a function of their
authorizing statutes or of their own expertise in implementing them. 18
compliance with NEPA in the reconstruction of access roads and bridges to Yosemite, one court
confronted the plaintiffs’ non-impairment claims with the following (unproductive) logic:
The Organic Act itself does not mandate that the balance in any particular decision reflect one value over the other. For that reason, the Organic Act does not serve as basis
for a cause of action when the issue is confined to the Agency’s exercise of discretion in
attempting to balance valid competing values. The Organic Act would serve as a basis
for a cause of action were the NPS to allow use of a national park in a way that was not
in the interests of either conservation or public enjoyment or in a way that was clearly
against the interests of future generations.
Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1247 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
14. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 222 F.3d 819, 826 (10th Cir. 2000). See also
Molly N. Ross, The Requirement to Leave Park Resources And Values “Unimpaired,” 30 GEO.
WRIGHT F. 67 (2013).
15. See PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 335-86 (2d ed.
2002).
16. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-20 (1971) (holding
that Administrative Procedure Act exception to reviewability in 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) for actions
“committed to agency discretion by law” is a narrow exemption); Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-57 (1983).
17. NEPA’s “action-forcing” mandate is, principally, the preparation of a “detailed
statement” whenever a proposal of a “major Federal action[]” that may “significantly affect the
quality of the human environment” on the alternatives thereto and the impacts thereof. 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(C).
18. See Jamison E. Colburn, The Risk in Discretion: Substantive NEPA’s Significance, 41
COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 1, 6-13 (2016); see also Jamison E. Colburn, Administering the National
Environmental Policy Act, 45 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10287, 10307 (2015).
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When they do so in rules or guidance, those tools then become a focal
point in contests over administrative discretion and its ramifications in
the environment.
For decades now, NPS has held fast to an official “interpretation”
of the non-impairment mandate that analyzes impairment in the
following terms:
The impairment that is prohibited . . . is an impact that, in the professional judgment of the responsible NPS manager, would harm the integrity of park resources or values, including the opportunities that
otherwise would be present for the enjoyment of those resources or
values. Whether an impact meets this definition depends on the particular resources and values that would be affected; the severity, duration,
and timing of the impact; the direct and indirect effects of the impact;
and the cumulative effects of the impact in question and other impacts. 19

This interpretation may accentuate the “professional judgment” of the
responsible official, 20 but it must be grounded in whatever may
compromise the “integrity” of some park element or its enjoyment. For
the document further decomposes the standard by defining “resources”
as “scenery, natural and historic objects, and wildlife, and the processes
and conditions that sustain them,” and park “values” as “appropriate
opportunities to experience enjoyment” thereof, “to the extent that can
be done without impairing them.” 21 And the list of influences that could
fit that bill is vast.
To be sure, the 2006 Management Policies and later guidance make
clear that impairment as a threshold is often problematic—that
impairments are frequently uncertain and contestable. Subsequent
guidance on non-impairment determinations and their relationship to
NEPA routines observed that “[a]n impact would be less likely to
constitute an impairment if it is an unavoidable result of an action

19. U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK SERV., MANAGEMENT POLICIES 2006 §
1.4.5 (2006) (hereafter “2006 MANAGEMENT POLICIES”).
20. The 2006 policies’ glossary defines “professional judgment,” a term that appears in
several key places in the manual, as:
a decision or opinion that is shaped by study and analysis and full consideration of all the
relevant facts, and that takes into account the decision-makers education, training, and
experience; advice or insights offered by subject matter experts and others who have relevant knowledge and experience; good science and scholarship; and, whenever appropriate, the results of civic engagement and public involvement activities relating to the decision.
Id. at 159.
21. Id. at § 1.4.6.
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necessary to preserve or restore the integrity of park resources or values
and it cannot be further mitigated.” 22 Note that it is the purpose of an
action there which would remove it from the impairment ledger and that,
given the definition of park “values,” a purpose of maintaining or
enhancing access can count as a consideration against an impairment
finding. Interestingly, a transition zone, which NPS calls “unacceptable
impacts,” 23 now further segments the field of impact/integrity fact
finding. While these impacts are not “impairments,” per se, they are
today prohibited by NPS rule. They include such things as impeding the
“attainment of a park’s desired future conditions,” the creation of an
“unsafe or unhealthful environment,” and the unreasonable interference
with “the atmosphere of peace and tranquility, or the natural
soundscape” of parks. 24 In NPS’s telling, beyond these impacts deemed
“unacceptable” lay actual impairment, i.e., beyond a discernible frontier
dividing the two.

Of course, this statutory standard has now weathered decades of
change—when conservation goals have been ascendant and when they
have been in retreat.25 Thus, today’s non-impairment mandate is not just
a reflection of the 1916 ideal, the hard-fought bureaucratic and political
22. See National Park Serv., Guidance for Non-Impairment Determinations and the NPS
NEPA Process, 2 (Sept. 2011).
23. 2006 MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 19 at § 1.4.7.1.
24. Id., As the Tenth Circuit has concluded, this is at once both a legal and a factual
conclusion—worthy of judicial scrutiny under either set of standards. See S. Utah Wilderness
Alliance v. Dabney, 222 F.3d 819, 829 (10th Cir. 2000).
25. See ROBERT B. KEITER, TO CONSERVE UNIMPAIRED: THE EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL
PARK IDEA 264-67 (2013).
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lessons learned from the General Authorities Act, the Redwood
Amendment, and other, more recent congressional attention to the park
system. 26 It was forged most recently out of political fires set within the
Department of Interior in 2005.
Several Bush Administration appointees tried—unsuccessfully—to
insinuate the notion of “irreversible” change into the meaning of
impairment, 27 a move the New York Times editorial board quickly
denounced as a “frontal attack on the idea of impairment.” 28 A core
driver of that dispute, one that made trips to federal court before (and
which have continued since), 29 was the place of motorized vehicle
access vis-à-vis the non-impairment mandate. 30 What quantity or quality
of disruption within a park’s ecosystem would motorized vehicles have
to create to rise to the level of “irreversible” impairment of that park?
Would it be coextensive with jeopardizing the integrity of park
resources? After the Bush Administration changed course, no answer
ever emerged.
Of course, virtually any choice NPS personnel make in balancing
access and enjoyment of the parks against their longer-term
compositional or functional “integrity” can intersect with the regulative
notion of non-impairment. Human use and enjoyment of nature, after all,
are under most interpretations synonymous with its disruption: the
consumption, disturbance, modification—or at least interruption—of
nature. 31 To be clear, some access controls within the park system have
less to do with non-impairment than with minimizing conflicts among
user groups. 32 But a growing share of access controls stem from the
26. Id. at 261-70 (detailing the Organic Act’s arc from leading conservation mandate to
passive restraint on over-development of the parks to secondary protection after enactment of the
Wilderness Act, Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Endangered Species Act and finally to its current role
of enhancing connections between park system governance, science, and conservation). As an aside,
the 2014 repeal and re-enactment of the park system’s organizing legislation—including the
Organic Act—raises the possibility that 1916’s ideals now lay beneath 2014’s legislative ratification
of a century’s worth of judicial and administrative interpretation. See HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF
LAW 1365-68 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
27. See Felicity Barringer, Top Official Urged Change in How Parks are Managed, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2005, at 1.
28. See Op-Ed, Destroying the National Parks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005, at 2.
29. See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
30. See Barringer, supra note 27.
31. Cf. JEDIDIAH PURDY, AFTER NATURE: A POLITICS FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE 13 (2015)
(“Most of us know, or suspect, what history bears out: that “nature” has been a vessel for many
inconsistent ideas, whether one claims to be following it or overcoming it”).
32. Cf. Bicycle Trails Council of Marin v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1450 (9th Cir. 1996)
(upholding NPS determination that bicycling off-road in parks be prohibited until specifically
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parks’ loss of natural composition and/or function and the factual
connections linking that loss to anthropogenic forces. With climate
change as the emergent disruptive force above all such forces, the parks
have seemingly entered a permanently defensive crouch against the loss
of natural flora, fauna, and functionality. 33 What is NPS’s place in that
new normal?
Another way to understand this nexus is that our age of disruption
is quickly rendering the non-impairment mandate a massive—perhaps
NPS’s defining—legal, administrative, and informational challenge. A
century ago, a wholly informal letter from Interior Secretary Lane to
NPS Director Mather could set the broad contours of an agenda for the
century to come. 34 Today, the public affinity for the parks, coupled with
the kaleidoscope of threats to park integrity, have necessitated
extraordinarily detailed yet permanently tentative policy guidance,
factual study, and lawyering. For its part, NPS has taken an increasingly
legalistic approach to its personnel’s non-impairment judgments. In its
1988 Management Policies document, NPS explained that:
[t]he word “unimpaired” plays an important role in the conservation of
resources and providing for present-day public enjoyment. Both physical resources, such as wildlife and geologic features, and intangible
values, such as scenic vistas and solitude, may be impaired. Over the
years, legislative and administrative actions have been taken that have
brought some measure of change to these components of our national
parks. Such actions impact park resources, yet they are not necessarily
deemed to have impaired resources for the enjoyment of future generations. Whether an individual action is or is not an “impairment” is a
management determination. In reaching it, the manager should consider such factors as the spatial and temporal extent of the impacts, the resources being impacted and their ability to adjust to those impacts, the
relation of the impacted resources to other park resources, and the cumulative as well as the individual effects. 35

Managers balancing multiple factors—as the 1988 interpretation had
it—were, of course, familiar with the scope of review doctrines of the
permitted unit-by-unit).
33. See SAUNDERS ET AL., supra note 3.
34. See Franklin K. Lane, Secretary Lane’s Letter on National Park Management (May 13,
1918), in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM: THE CRITICAL DOCUMENTS, 48 (Larry Dilsaver
ed., 1994). The Lane Letter famously ‘directed’ Mather to seek out new parks only where they
exhibited “scenery of supreme and distinctive quality or some national feature so extraordinary or
unique as to be of national interest and importance.” Id. at 51.
35. U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK SERV., MANAGEMENT POLICIES 1988 1:3
(1988) (hereafter “1988 MANAGEMENT POLICIES”).
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day. 36 Most of those doctrines were quite deferential by the 1980s.37
Still, any factored judgment where the factors being weighed either are
not quantified at all or cannot be compared through a unitary value like
money will implicate the balancer’s own judgment. 38 And the 1988
manual made clear that “impairment,” especially in systems that had
been thoroughly upset by a century or more of human interference, was
a dynamic concept:
Ecological processes altered in the past by human activities may need
to be abetted to maintain the closest approximation of the natural ecosystem where a truly natural system is no longer attainable. Prescribed
burning is an example. The extent and degree of management actions
taken to protect or restore park ecosystems or their components will be
determined in light of management objectives and prevailing scientific
theory and methodologies. 39

What the 2001 and 2006 updates put into sharp relief are this impairment
standard’s distinguishable facets: its separable aspects of fact, law, and
discretion. 40 The 2006 Management Policies’ separate definition of park
“resources” and “values” 41 and articulation of a presumptive procedural
path for a non-impairment determination, 42 to say nothing of its listing
several examples of impacts that ordinarily constitute impairments, 43 at
the very least organize the administrative record any of these
determinations should entail. Furthermore, the various iterations of the
Management Policies document have proven real constraints in litigation
36. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
37. The State Farm opinion, see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46-57 (1983), which has since become the locus classicus of arbitrariness review
in the balancing of multiple agency objectives, was never mentioned in a precedent reviewing the
management of ORVs at Cape Cod National Seashore, even though the court—citing precedents
upholding searching reviews—rejected the arbitrariness challenges brought against NPS. See
Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Clark, 590 F. Supp. 1467, 1474 (D. Mass. 1984) (citing Greater
Boston Television Corp. v . FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
38. Cf. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 652 (1990) (declining to
overturn agency judgment on grounds agency could not fully specify the relevance of the factor it
weighed).
39. 1988 MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 35 at 4:2. NPS’s place in the long history of
fire suppression and the consequent disruption of its fire-adapted ecosystems is recounted in
Stephen Pyne’s history, Fire in America. See STEPHEN J. PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL
HISTORY OF WILDLAND RURAL FIRE 295-305 (1982).
40. In the 2006 version, Sections 1.4.6 and 1.4.7 appeared substantively as they appeared in
the 2001 document. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK SERV., MANAGEMENT
POLICIES 2001 12-13 (2001).
41. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
42. See 2006 MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 19 at § 1.4.7.
43. See id. at § 1.4.7.1.
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over their application, with several courts finding that they “bind” NPS
like any other legal rule. 44 As litigation over particular park management
decisions quickens, these different facets are growing more clearly
contestable as such, enabling an increasingly granular approach to nonimpairment as a governance standard. However, with its resolution of
discrete units’ discrete “resources” and “values” as the objects of nonimpairment, the 2006 policy—combined with the growing frequency of
judicial review—are creating informational burdens NPS personnel have
yet fully to comprehend let alone shoulder in a sustainable way. 45 Part
III describes that trend.
NEPA is both facilitating and consolidating this trend. As more
non-impairment litigation has involved NEPA claims, 46 and more NPS
actions have resulted in NEPA documents, the trend line is manifest: the
fuller intertwining of NEPA’s procedural (and, to a lesser extent
substantive) values with non-impairment. 47 Indeed, in 2011 guidance
issued to all field staff, NPS noted that “[a]ctions that require preparation
of EAs and EISs constitute actions that may have the potential to impair
park resources or values” and that, therefore, “a non-impairment
determination must be made for any action selected in a FONSI or
[EIS/]ROD that could impact park resources and values.” 48 An updated
Director’s Order No. 12 on conservation and impact analysis states that
“[r]ead together, the provisions of NEPA and the [Organic Act] are
consonant and jointly commit the Service to make informed decisions
that perpetuate the conservation and protection of park resources
unimpaired for the benefit and enjoyment of future generations.” 49 If
these separately evolved legal norms are now intertwined and coevolving, it is not without disruptive ramifications all its own. For NEPA
has become the preeminent tool of those who would challenge and seek

44. See, e.g., Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359, 366 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2000). But see The
Wilderness Soc’y v. Norton, 434 F.3d 584, 595-96 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (rejecting Davis and concluding
that the 2006 Management Policies is not a binding rule).
45. The 2006 definition of “park resources and values” include (but apparently are not
limited to) scenery, natural and historic objects, wildlife “and the processes and conditions that
sustain them,” visibility, soundscapes and smells, soils, archaeological, cultural and historic objects,
sites and structures, and “the park’s role in contributing to the national dignity” and the “benefit and
inspiration provided to the American people.” 2006 MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 19 at §
1.4.6.
46. See infra notes 53-101 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 107-39 and accompanying text.
48. See National Park Serv., Guidance for Non-Impairment Determinations and the NPS
NEPA Process, 1 (Sept. 2011).
49. See Jonathan B. Jarvis, Director, National Park Serv., Director’s Order #12:
Conservation Planning, Environmental Impact Analysis, and Decision-Making, 2 (Oct. 5, 2011).
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to delay the decisions of government—whatever its aims or goals. And
that makes NPS’s NEPA compliance into a fertile source of conflict and,
by extension, agency circumspection. Part III surveys that co-evolution
to the present.
III. NON-IMPAIRMENT IN THE AGE OF NEPA
By the 1980s, NPS’s authority to exclude “consumptive” uses from
the park system, e.g., fishing, hunting, trapping, etc., had been solidly
established. 50 That was certainly evidence of an epochal change from the
parks’ founding, but the agency had rarely faced challengers alleging
that it was being insufficiently protective of the parks. 51 That soon
changed, though, and NEPA was a big impetus. As external pressures
increased to manage the parks and their surroundings as integrated
systems, 52 NPS became a regular target with NEPA as the weapon of
choice.
In Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 53 NPS was set to rebuild Highway 140
into Yosemite from the park’s western border to Pohono Bridge after
flooding had badly damaged the road and its supporting bridges around
the Merced River. 54 Sierra Club sued, arguing that its EA/FONSI was
flawed and had been finished after the decisions had all been made. 55
Notably, the NEPA claims succeeded (and merited injunctive relief)
where the claim that the rebuilding was courting an impairment contrary
to the Organic Act failed summarily. 56
Another formative precedent attacked NPS’s lack of basic
information about baseline conditions even as it reached NEPA
conclusions. In National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 57 NPS
was set to increase the number of large cruise ships entering Glacier Bay
50. See, e.g., Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1991);
NRA v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1986); Organized Fishermen of Florida v. Watt, 590 F.
Supp. 805 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
51. The opinion in Daingerfield Island Protective Soc’y v. Babbitt, 823 F. Supp. 950 (D.D.C.
1993), is representative. In summarily dismissing plaintiffs’ challenge to NPS’s permission to build
a new interchange between Mount Vernon Memorial Highway and George Washington Parkway,
the court held the Organic Act’s non-impairment mandate was not violated and NPS’s
determinations were not arbitrary, despite evidence offered by plaintiffs—from NPS’s own EIS—
suggesting otherwise. Id. at 955-57.
52. See generally Robert B. Keiter, NEPA and the Emerging Concept of Ecosystem
Management on the Public Lands, 25 LAND & WATER L. REV. 43 (1990).
53. Sierra v. Babbitt, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
54. Id. at 1207-09.
55. Id. at 1217.
56. See id. at 1247.
57. Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 2001).
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National Park by over 70%, without having prepared an EIS. 58 The
agency claimed that too little was known about the ships’ effects on
resident wildlife in the Bay to conclude that the impacts would be
“significant” enough to necessitate a full impact statement. 59 Yet it still
found no significant impact to be expected from its proposal. NPS’s
“mitigated FONSI” promised to monitor the results of the traffic
increase and take corrective actions if needed.60 The Ninth Circuit was
convinced that a “finding” predicated on uncertainty was contrary to
NEPA and CEQ’s regulations. 61 No recourse to the non-impairment
mandate was needed, although it certainly could have gone that direction
had the litigants so chosen. 62
In Fund for Animals v. Mainella, 63 NPS had long refused to
reconsider its contributions to game hunting on the Cape Cod National
Seashore or to prepare a NEPA document analyzing the impacts
thereof. 64 A 1998 EIS on the general management plan took no “hard
look” at any population effects or site-specific effects of hunting and the
court found that this constituted a violation of NEPA. 65 Interestingly, the
court declined to “enjoin” the hunting program on the circular logic that
“[b]ecause the environmental consequences of the hunting program have
not been comprehensively evaluated, it cannot be known whether or not
ending hunting will have a deleterious environmental effect, such as by
allowing for the over-breeding of some species, like deer.” 66 It ordered
the preparation of an EA for the hunting program and enjoined pheasant
hunting (a lesser included part of the unit’s hunting program) for the
same NEPA lapses. 67 Again, missing from the Fund for Animals opinion
is any reference to non-impairment. Indeed, Fund for Animals may be
unique in its ordering that an EA be prepared for the continuation of a
general policy trend given NEPA’s notorious triggering requirement that
some discrete agency action or proposal be at issue. 68
58. Id. at 728. NPS received about 450 comments on its proposed vessel management plan
and EA/FONSI. About 85% of which were opposed to the chosen alternative. Id.
59. Id. at 731-32.
60. Id. at 733.
61. Id. at 734.
62. The court’s guidance on the injunctive relief to be issued, ordering that the increase in
vessel traffic be enjoined until NPS could better understand its possible consequences, id. at 738-39,
suggests that an impairment claim would have succeeded, too.
63. Fund for Animals v. Mainella, 283 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D. Mass. 2003).
64. See id. at 423-26.
65. See id. at 434.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 434-35.
68. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 8:23 (2015 ed.).
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In High Country Citizens’ Alliance v. Norton, NPS attempted to
relinquish a water right the Winters doctrine protected to the Black
Canyon of the Gunnison National Park. 69 NPS’s agreement with the
State of Colorado was completed without any NEPA process, however,
and the court easily concluded that a “permanent relinquishment of a
water right with a 1933 priority date for such a scientifically,
ecologically, and historically important national park must be viewed as
a major action requiring compliance with NEPA.” 70 That holding alone
should have been enough to invalidate the arrangement. 71 But the court
went further to hold that NPS had violated several of its legal obligations
as trustee of the park 72—most especially its responsibilities under the
Organic Act. 73 Removing resources from NPS governance may or may
not lead to their impairment. With no NEPA analysis the court was
unable to say, but their being managed by any other authority was, in the
court’s estimate, “in direct contravention of” the Organic Act.74
In Sierra Club v. Mainella, 75 an NPS FONSI accompanying the
agency’s decision to permit surface activities stemming from oil and gas
drilling beneath Big Thicket National Preserve was invalidated and the
judgment it supported was set aside as arbitrary and capricious. 76 NPS
had prepared the EA/FONSI in connection with its permission to the
drilling operations and had simultaneously prepared a non-impairment
determination. 77 Finding several of the risks NPS dismissed as “very low
probability,” “negligible,” and/or “moderate” impact as potentially
anything but, the court derided NPS’s “descriptors of the impacts” as
“wholly uninformative.” 78 “Assigning labels to impacts . . . provides the
Court with no basis to determine first, whether NPS reasonably
concluded that the impact is “moderate,” and second, whether NPS
69. High Country Citizens’ All. v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1237-38 (D. Colo. 2006).
The Winters doctrine provides that federal lands withdrawn from the public domain reserve by
implication any available water rights needed to fulfill the purpose(s) of the reservation. See
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) (citing Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564
(1908)).
70. High Country Citizens’ All., 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1245.
71. The APA provides that reviewing courts shall “set aside” as unlawful any agency action
taken “without observance of procedures required by law.” Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(D) (1966).
72. See High Country Citizens’ All., 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1246-53.
73. See id. at 1246 (quoting Nat’l Parks Serv., 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1916) (repealed by Nat’l Parks
Service and Related Programs Enactment, Pub. L. 113-287 § 7, 128 Stat. 3272 (2014).
74. See High Country Citizens’ All., 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1252.
75. Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2006).
76. See id. at 108.
77. See id. at 82-83.
78. Id. at 100.
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reasonably concluded that a “moderate” impact should not, under the
relevant circumstances, be considered an impairment.” 79
In Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Kempthorne, 80 planning
snowmobile use in Greater Yellowstone provoked a series of challenges
to the rationality of the non-impairment determinations and to the
sufficiency of NPS’s NEPA documents. 81 Professor Keiter observed that
this case and the related litigation were debated at the “highest” levels of
government. 82 After planning first to exclude, then to limit, and then to
allow snowmobile use unabated, the agency’s rationality took center
stage. 83 The 2006 Management Policies’ approach to non-impairment
structured the court’s scrutiny, especially the statement that
“conservation is to be predominant.” 84 NPS, the court observed, “cannot
circumvent this limitation through conclusory declarations that certain
adverse impacts are acceptable, without explaining why those impacts
are necessary and appropriate to fulfill the purposes of the park.” 85 It
then proceeded to break down NPS’s calculations—or lack thereof—
purporting to show the negligibility of snowmobiles’ effects upon
wildlife, quiet and solitude, and clean air in Greater Yellowstone. 86 For
each issue, the court took the agency’s factual findings as given, but
proceeded to show some factual gap or incompletely reasoned inference
from the facts undermining the soundness of the agency’s conclusions.
For example, on the impacts to resident wildlife including elk, bison,
eagles and coyotes, where NPS had logged studies of various species’
responses to snowmobiles’ presence as “vigilant,” “active” avoidance,
no visible response, etc., the court faulted the agency both for its
conclusory assertions that the recorded impacts were “moderate” or
“negligible,” and for its failure to project and analyze expected future

79. Id. at 101. “An unbounded term cannot suffice to support an agency’s decision because it
provides no objective standard for determining what kind of differential makes one impact more or
less significant than another.” Id.
80. Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Kempthorne, 577 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D.D.C. 2008).
81. A parallel suit was litigated in Wyoming Lodging and Rest. Ass’n v. United States DOI,
398 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Wyo. 2005).
82. See KEITER, supra note 52 at 77-79.
83. See Greater Yellowstone Coal., 577 F. Supp. 2d at 186-88. A 2000 EIS on snowmobiles
in Yellowstone concluded that the then-existing conditions were impairing the park’s soundscapes,
wildlife, and air quality. Id. at 195. The D.C. district court’s involvement in the prior iterations is
recorded in Fund for Animals v. Norton, 323 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2004), and Fund for Animals v.
Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D.D.C. 2003).
84. Greater Yellowstone Coal., 577 F. Supp. 2d at 192 (quoting 2006 MANAGEMENT
POLICIES, supra note 19 at § 1.4.3).
85. Greater Yellowstone Coal., 577 F. Supp.2d at 193.
86. See id. at 194-209.
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impacts as the patterns of snowmobile use changed. 87
In Bluewater Network v. Salazar, 88 a decision to permit “personal
watercraft” (PWC)—jet skis and similar equipment—back into parks
from which they had been excluded prompted one federal judge to ask:
[w]hy has NPS issued Rules allowing jetski use in two beautiful and
pristine national parks, acknowledging that such use will impact, to
varying degrees, water quality, air quality, wildlife, animal habitats,
soundscapes, visitor use and safety, etc., when the users of jetskis are
perfectly free to enjoy their vehicles in other equally accessible areas,
without threatening the serenity, the tranquility—indeed, the majesty—
of these two national treasures. 89

The judge’s question stemmed from NPS’s own approach to nonimpairment and the information its NEPA analyses gathered. When NPS
first moved to ban PWCs from park units, it cited the rapid increase in
their popularity and power and the consequent noise and chemical
pollution issues they raised. 90 However, the rule allowed NPS units to
permit PWCs back by individual rulemaking, which several units then
undertook. NPS personnel prepared two park-specific EAs to analyze the
impacts of continued PWC use within the Gulf Islands National
Seashore and Pictured Rocks National Lakeshore. 91 After an especially
searching review employing the standard State Farm arbitrarinessreview framework, 92 the court concluded that the Gulf Shore Islands
NPS unit had failed adequately to explain or to substantiate how
continued use of PWCs would not impair park resources and values.93
The court separately faulted NPS both for its failure to gather and sort
adequate factual support for its conclusions and for its failed justification
or “reasoned explanation” for its choices.94 Even NPS’s gathering of
specific pollution estimates, using them to determine that the PWCs
would not impair park values was deemed “conclusory” for failing to
explain how much PWC pollution was too much. 95
87. See id. at 202-05.
88. Bluewater Network v. Salazar, 721 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2010).
89. Id. at 10.
90. See id. at 11 (citing Personal Watercraft Use Within the NPS System, 65 Fed. Reg.
15077-080 (2000)).
91. See Bluewater Network, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 12-15. Plaintiffs in the action were deemed to
lack standing to challenge the proceedings at Picture Rocks National Seashore. Id. at 17-18.
92. See id. at 21-25.
93. See id. at 21-38.
94. See id. at 37-38.
95. See id. at 29-30. “NPS labeled the impact of PWC emissions . . . as “negligible.” There is
no specific and detailed explanation as to how it arrived at that conclusion; without such an
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In Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 96 the use of off-road vehicles
(ORVs) in Big Cypress National Preserve was the issue, particularly the
reopening of ORV traffic to some of the preserve’s best Florida panther
habitat. 97 ORV traffic predated the preserve’s establishment as a park
system unit and NPS had faced years of conflict over its management.
Key to the settlement of a 1995 lawsuit—according to the plaintiffs—
was NPS’s promise to develop an EIS analyzing the cumulative effects
of ORV use and its management throughout the preserve. 98 The court
found that no such promise had been made, but followed up by finding
that NPS had violated the CEQ regulations requiring a supplemental EIS
under the circumstances in any event. 99 Worse, with the non-impairment
obligation as the default, 100 NPS’s failure to update its NEPA analysis
even as its ORV traffic policy in the preserve swerved left its decision
without a rational basis. 101
NPS has rarely lost a case where its management decisions caused
the curtailment of access to the national parks. 102 And that is likely to
continue. What these cases represent collectively is a changed
institutional and factual context within which impairment will operate as
a governing legal standard. Impairment combined with NEPA’s broad
procedural ambit and information demands can be found anywhere,
depending on the burden of proof. Indeed, as more sophisticated
challenges are mounted to decisions erring on the side of access
(particularly motorized access), opponents will have their choice of
targets. The 2011 guidance on impairment and NEPA made clear that
while the NEPA determination(s) and non-impairment determinations
are legally separate, every non-impairment determination, on its own,
“must include a discussion, for each impacted resource analyzed in
detail in the associate EA or EIS, of why the selected action’s impacts
will not result in impairment.” 103 And that increases the chances that
some factual and/or rational basis behind whatever inferences from past
experience or data supporting the agency’s conclusions can be refuted—

explanation, there is no rational connection between the facts found (quantitative data) and the final
conclusions reached (negligible impact and non-impairment.”). Id. at 30.
96. Def. of Wildlife v. Salazar, 877 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
97. Id. at 1279-89.
98. Id. at 1293.
99. See id. at 1300-01 (construing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.9(c)(1)(i)-(ii)) (1977).
100. See Def. of Wildlife, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 1275-76.
101. See id. at 1302.
102. Or, where it has lost the occasional trial court decision, it has usually prevailed on appeal.
See, e.g., Mausolf v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 1997).
103. 2011 NEPA Guidance, supra note 22 at 4.
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or at least put in question. Derivatively, it increases the chances that the
decision to limit access protectively is NPS’s path of least resistance.
NEPA will continue to expose any weaknesses regardless of the decision
to increasingly searching judicial scrutiny, but the non-impairment
mandate may shade NPS’s substantive alternatives nevertheless.
IV. WHERE WILL NEPA/NON-IMPAIRMENT LITIGATION LEAD?
Conjectures that discrete parks will face threats in our climatedisrupted future which depart substantially from experience, though
surely grounded in fact, 104 often ignore how much upset and change NPS
already handles on a regular basis. Localized extinctions and
reintroductions, for example, have long been the norm. 105 But what
NEPA/impairment litigation has highlighted over the last two decades is
the agency’s need to engage in technically defensible site-specific risk
planning which is then subject to increasingly searching external review.
Indeed, with a statutory mandate since 1998 to “undertake a program of
inventory and monitoring of National Park System resources to establish
baseline information and to provide information on the long-term trends
in the condition of National Park System resources,” 106 NPS faces
increasingly stringent and broadly applicable duties of this kind.
Yet NPS’s differentiation of non-impairment’s legal, factual, and
discretionary facets ignores the hardest question: at what scale are any of
these risks to be managed? Elsewhere I have argued at length that NEPA
in its best light turns agencies like NPS toward a more systemic
understanding and management of risk. 107 To do that, an agency like
NPS must be willing to organize itself to attack the irremediable
uncertainties through which we confront the threats we take seriously
but cannot, despite our best efforts, quantify. Too often, this will mean
trading off the narrow-gauged study of threats so that a whole
organization can better comprehend the same or related threats at larger
scales. 108 Take, for example, the loss of ice and snow (and glacial cover)
104. See, e.g., SAUNDERS ET AL., supra note 3.
105. See, e.g., Robert B. Keiter, Wildlife Conservation, Climate Change, and Ecosystem
Management, in THE LAWS OF NATURE: REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT LAW & POLICY, 235 (Kalyani Robbins, ed., 2013).
106. 16 U.S.C. § 5934 (1998)(repealed by Pub. L. 113-287 § 7, 128 Stat. 3272 (2014)).
107. See Jamison E. Colburn, Addition by Subtraction: NEPA Routines as Means to More
Systemic Ends, in THE LAWS OF NATURE: REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT LAW & POLICY, 145, 163-67 (Kalyani Robbins, ed., 2013); Colburn, Risk in
Discretion, supra note 18 at 46-48.
108. See Colburn, Addition by Subtraction, supra note 107 at 155-60; Colburn, Risk in
Discretion, supra note 18 at 53-54.
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at a dozen iconic parks from Acadia to Yosemite. 109 Clearly, planning
for an ice-free future in places evolved to depend on snowpack or glacial
melt cannot be done from experience alone.110 But neither will systemwide preparations follow from those plans conceived in situ—least of all
in a park system devised to welcome the American touring public as a
whole. 111 This section considers how NEPA can and should prompt
NPS’s adaptation of its non-impairment decision-making to our age of
disruption.
A. Risk Selection: Distorting an Already Distorted Enterprise?
Another case supplies what could be the clearest lens yet on where
the NEPA/non-impairment train is headed. The case, Grunewald v.
Jarvis, 112 is about thinning the deer herd in Rock Creek Park. Rock
Creek Park is an oasis surrounded on all sides by the urban and suburban
development of greater Washington, D.C. It was established decades
before the park system or NPS. 113 But without natural predators, the only
limiting factors on the deer population in the park—which had been
extirpated as of the park’s establishment in 1890—have been
automobiles and disease. 114 Deer at high enough densities can prevent a
vegetation community from reproducing itself, and NPS, after studying
109. See SAUNDERS ET AL., supra note 3 at 7-10 (listing parks most at risk for loss of glaciers,
ice and snow).
110. This is especially true in places where the loss of surface water is expected to coincide
with the overthrow of traditional plant communities, id. at 19, the loss of dominant wildlife species,
id. at 25, and the onset of unprecedentedly extreme weather events. Id. at 15. Some NPS regions
have been modeling expected future conditions for years. See, e.g., Stephen T. Gray et al., Using
Integrated Ecosystem Modeling to Understand Climate Change, 12 ALASKA PARK SCI. (Nov. 2,
2013), available at https://www.nps.gov/articles/aps-v12-i2-c3.htm.
111. As more of America seeks outdoor adventure and more parks come under greater strains
from climate change, those parks doing comparatively better, all things considered, should expect to
see their visitor numbers increase more rapidly than those known to be suffering. See William B.
Monahan & Nicholas A. Fisichelli, Climate Exposure of US National Parks in a New Era of
Change, 9 PLOS ONE e101302 (Moncho Gomez-Gesteira, ed., Nov. 2, 2013). Overall, 307 million
visits to the parks in 2015 means both “an enormous, unique opportunity to communicate what
climate change may do to us and what we can do about it,” SAUNDERS ET AL., supra note 3 at 41,
and a tsunami of demand for use of the parks.
112. Grunewald v. Jarvis, 776 F.3d 893 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Thinning over-abundant ungulate
populations has become a repeat-play NEPA ordeal for NPS. See Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359,
367-68 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
113. Grunewald, 776 F.3d at 896. After monitoring revealed the park’s deer density of roughly
67 per square mile and an unmistakable “browse line” (the height at which deer cannot reach
vegetation, below which, at high enough densities, deer browse away all vegetation), NPS began
planning a deer cull. Id. at 897.
114. See Grunewald v. Jarvis, 930 F. Supp. 2d 73, 78 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, Grunewald v.
Jarvis, 776 F.3d 893.
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deer densities in the park, decided that thinning was necessary. 115 It
prepared an EIS from reports of a science team116 and proposed
alternative plans mixing lethal and nonlethal controls, ultimately
deciding that nonlethal methods would not adequately shrink the
population. 117 The process included a public meeting with 125 attendees,
much correspondence with interested parties, and in-depth analysis of
the proposed nonlethal measures. 118
The trouble was: the more NPS studied deer in Rock Creek Park,
the less convinced some of its stakeholders became of their overabundance and the more difficult finding any provable, scientifically
grounded solutions became. 119 A December 2013 issue of Time
Magazine featuring a White-tailed deer on the cover with the title
“America’s Pest Problem” 120 provoked a similar reaction nationally to
the one NPS had met in Rock Creek Park. Time called for an urgent
response to nuisance wildlife running amok and championed a
nationwide push to increase sport hunting. 121 The article was as much
editorial as exposé, though, and the comparisons between it and NPS’s
work on the Rock Creek Park deer herd should have ended quickly. But
the lawsuit bringing NPS’s approach to federal court kept that from
happening.
A litigation-driven, issue-centric approach to something as organic,
dynamic, and uncertain as the “integrity” of heavily disturbed systems,
or their potential “impairment” over a longer term, will entail expanding
process and information burdens as it further intertwines with NEPA.
With litigants mostly motivated to stop whatever NPS action they are
challenging, it will tend to accentuate whatever uncertainties simply
cannot be eliminated, ending in the now-familiar paradox of the
increasing uncertainty that grows from focused study. 122 This can be
productive where organized attention to some threat, its probability
distribution(s), and/or its expected consequences narrows the

115. See Grunewald, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 79-80.
116. Id.
117. See Grunewald, 776 F.3d at 897.
118. See id. at 897-98.
119. As for the plaintiffs, the factual issues drawing the bulk of their attention were the
relationship, if any, between deer browsing and the reproduction rate of native—as opposed to
“exotic”—vegetation species, see Grunewald, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 82-84, 86-87, and the efficacy of
non-lethal deer control measures. See id. at 91-92.
120. See David Von Drehle, America’s Pest Problem, TIME (Dec. 9, 2013).
121. See Von Drehle, supra note 120 at 41.
122. See, e.g., Marjolein B. A. van Asselt & Ellen Vos, The Precautionary Principle and the
Uncertainty Paradox, 9 J. RISK RES. 313, 317-18 (2006).
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uncertainties affecting public choice. 123 But it can also become a vicious
circle that erodes public confidence in science and expertise. 124
Congress’s 1998 mandate that NPS utilize the “highest quality science
and information,” 125 like NEPA’s mandate that only “high quality”
information” and “[a]ccurate scientific analysis” 126 be used, did not so
much resolve this trap as deepen it. 127
Even more importantly, investment in process or information
collection/creation will have no necessary correlation with stakeholder
satisfaction given the diversity of views among well-funded but
disparately motivated groups like the Sierra Club, WildEarth Guardians,
or snowmobilers in Yellowstone. When all of that is rolled up together
with NEPA and its priorities of disclosure, deliberation, and informed
decision-making, NEPA challenges turn agency personnel increasingly
toward the management of litigation risks. 128 It is this lens that casts
NEPA and the non-impairment mandate as a cautionary tale looking
further into our age of disruption.
In Bluewater Network, 129 Sierra Club v. Mainella, 130 and
elsewhere, courts have refused to accept NPS’s mere description of an
expected impact and a conclusory dismissal of that impact as something
less than an impairment. 131 They have required explanations why an
expected impact will not impair park resources. NEPA precedents are
characteristically difficult to synthesize into generalizable principles of
123. See, e.g., George Gray et al., Beef, Hormones, and Mad Cows, in THE REALITY OF
PRECAUTION: COMPARING RISK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 65 (Jonathan B.
Wiener et al., eds., 2011).
124. See HEATHER E. DOUGLAS, SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE VALUE-FREE IDEAL (2009);
REALITY OF PRECAUTION.
125. The Nat’l Parks Omnibus Mgmt. Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-391, 112 Stat. 3497
(1998), included Title II—devoted entirely to enhancing park management “by providing clear
authority and direction for the conduct of scientific study in the National Park System and to use the
information gathered for management purposes.” 16 U.S.C. § 5931(2)(1998). Section 202 thereof
required NPS to “assure that management of units of the National Park System is enhanced by the
availability and utilization of a broad program of the highest quality science and information.” Id. at
§ 5932.
126. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b)(1970).
127. In 2014, Congress repealed Title II of the 1998 Omnibus reform act and re-enacted it as a
substantively identical version in a new Title 54. See Nat’l Park Service and Related Programs
Enactment, Pub. L. No. 113-287, § 7, 128 Stat. 3272 (2014), codified at 54 U.S.C. § 100702.
128. NPS’s latest NEPA Handbook features detailed guidance on, for example, compiling a
“decision file” which can later support the creation of an administrative record, the “minimum
required content” of EAs, and the procedural prerequisites to be observed for each NEPA routine
type. See NAT’L PARK SERV., NEPA HANDBOOK (2015).
129. Bluewater Network v. Salazar, 721 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2010).
130. Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2006).
131. See Bluewater, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 30; Sierra Club, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 100.
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law, 132 but this trend clearly points up a need for retrospective analysis
of past impact estimates and how they fared as events played out.
Combined with an underlying legal duty as inherently dynamic and
organic as the non-impairment mandate, NEPA’s “hard look” burden
only promises to grow more onerous and harder to distribute evenly
unless NPS organizes with the express purpose of doing so.
Of course, none of this is to say that NPS is powerless to resist. In
WildEarth Guardians v. Nat’l Park Serv., 133 for example, an
environmental group urged NPS to consider introducing a wolf
population as a means of controlling the elk herd in Rocky Mountain
National Park. Given the group pressing the claim and the nature of the
legal argument—that it should be among the “reasonable” alternatives
considered in an EIS accompanying park’s management plan—NPS had
every reason to assume the claim would be litigated. 134 NPS resisted
throughout, devoting substantial attention to rejecting the option as
impractical. 135 Ultimately, the reviewing court agreed, finding for NPS
on both the NEPA and the non-impairment claims. 136
Such exceptions prove the rule, though. For NPS to find a
“mature” 137 position on the risks of disruption and impairment, it will
inevitably have to trade off preparing for such litigation against other
factors. 138 And it should expect more lawsuits like the one in WildEarth
Guardians as ecological drivers are better understood. Ideally, NPS
would optimize both as to park-specific and broader scale challenges and
132. See Colburn, Administering NEPA, supra note 18 at 10296-97.
133. WildEarth Guardians v. Nat’l Park Serv., 804 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (D. Colo. 2011).
134. WildEarth Guardians has a reputation for being litigious. See, e.g., Elizabeth Shogren,
The Campaign Against Coal, HIGH COUNT. NEWS, Vol. 47, No. 19 at 13 (Nov. 9, 2015). The “rule
of reason” governing the selection of NEPA alternatives is notoriously flexible and susceptible to
interpretation. See William D. Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law
Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L.J. 699 (1979).
135. NPS convened a workshop of a dozen academic and agency experts on various topics,
including the experience of the Yellowstone reintroduction, modeling the wolf/elk interactions in
Rocky Mountain National Park, and the livestock impact of wolves in the region. WildEarth
Guardians, 804 F. Supp. 2d at 1156. From the evidence gathered at that workshop, NPS rejected the
option of reintroducing wolves and the court held that it did not do so arbitrarily. Id.
136. See id. at 1159-60.
137. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE CONSTITUTION OF RISK (2014) (developing a systematic
critique of laws animated by different risk governance principles and staking out a “mature”
position that optimizes both for precaution and uncertainty).
138. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT 80-81
(1994) (finding that without principles establishing default options in risk assessment and when to
depart from them, agencies are too prone to ad hoc risk selection and estimation); NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS: ADVANCING RISK ASSESSMENT 213-36 (2009)
(advocating the adoption of “cumulative risk” assessment protocols to keep agencies from overemphasizing single agent risks).
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meet the expanding threat of impairment/NEPA litigation with
investments aimed at tackling both. A key step to that end will be
transitioning its NEPA compliance routines—whether in the form of
EISs, EA/FONSIs, or CATXs—into the subroutines of a larger, more
integrated whole: the maintenance of the parks’ integrity in an age of
constant disruption. 139 Section B explains that strategy.
B. The NEPA/Non-Impairment Nexus: An Information Economy for the
Second Century
Transitioning to NEPA reviews that can comprise the subroutines
of a larger, agency-wide routine by which the agency assesses its
decisions in the light of experience and, from there, works to plan for an
unprecedented—disrupted—future will demand some key investments
and focused leadership. When the Department of Interior was urged to
require the internet publication of its bureaus’ NEPA CATX, it refused,
citing the administrative burdens of doing so. 140 NEPA’s
‘administrative’ burdens are, thus, hardly unknown at Interior or NPS. 141
However, this is the kind of prioritization that NPS must revisit in the
age of disruption.
The prevalent use of CATX determinations in place of EA/FONSIs
has generated real pressure for some kind of record substantiating the
agency conclusions therein. 142 NPS directs its personnel that
documentation of a CATX is normally required whenever “some level of
environmental impact” less than “significant adverse impacts” will
139. Cf. Colburn, Addition by Subtraction, supra note 107 at 163-67 (arguing that the more
summary NEPA routines could and should become valuable tools to risk planners operating at
broad scales if only they were reformed to be more explicit about the predictive methods employed,
the decision-makers’ attitudes and inferences from necessarily inconclusive evidence, and why one
NEPA compliance route was chosen over others).
140. See U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Final Rule: Implementation of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 73 Fed. Reg. 61292, 61305 (2008).
141. Tellingly, in the same rulemaking the Interior Department further specified CEQ’s
“incomplete or unavailable information” rule, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (1970) (allowing that, if its
costs are “exorbitant,” information can be deemed unavailable), stating that “[t]hese costs include
monetary costs as well as . . . social costs, delays, opportunity costs, and non-fulfillment or nontimely fulfillment of statutory mandates.” 73 Fed. Reg. at 61316 (reprinting 43 C.F.R. § 46.125)
(1969). Though the proposal raised many concerns, the Department finalized the rule unchanged.
See Id. at 61299.
142. See Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1094-95 (11th Cir. 2004); California
v. Norton, 311 F.3d 1162, 1175 (9th Cir. 2002). CEQ guidance on CATX determinations affirms the
approach taken in California v. Norton and Wilderness Watch. See Council on Envtl. Quality, Final
Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Establishing, Applying, and Revising
Categorical Exclusions Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 75628, 75632
(2010) (urging agencies to consider documenting the application of individual CATXs).
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result. 143 It directs that a “decision file” should ordinarily accompany
any NEPA routine and that this file be compiled as records are
identified. 144 These decision files are independent of, but often the basis
for, the “administrative record” lodged with the court in the event of
litigation. 145 But the labors of compiling such a file remain devoted to
litigation risk if they are not made more useful, standardized and
transparent. Digitizing them and making them available to a wider
community of inquiry would be a big step toward the organization’s
utilizing whatever “hard looks” are being taken at environmental
consequences. 146 The systematic uptake and re-analysis of the same
could go a long way toward the pursuit of NEPA’s most basic purpose:
understanding the cumulative effects our “Federal Government” causes
and turning it toward achieving a “productive harmony” between
humanity and nature. 147 Today, NPS literally provides no guidance on
the role of these decision files after the decision. 148
Interior’s departmental regulations state that bureaus including NPS
“shall apply the procedural requirements of NEPA when . . . [t]he effects
of the proposed action can be meaningfully evaluated.” 149 Yet, in
addition to CEQ’s own incomplete and unavailable information
contingency, the Department’s regulation also instructs its component
bureaus to consider all costs of obtaining information, including
“nonmonetized costs” such as “social costs, delays, opportunity costs,
and non-fulfillment or non-timely fulfillment of statutory mandates.” 150
Contrast that clarification of the types of reasons not to gather and/or
sort information about the environmental consequences of one’s actions
with what NPS has actually done to facilitate the study of “cumulative”

143. NEPA HANDBOOK, supra note 128 at 33.
144. See NAT’L PARK SERV., NEPA Handbook Supplemental Guidance: Compiling a Decision
File for NEPA Reviews (Sept. 2015), at 1, available at https://www.nps.gov/orgs/
1812/upload/NPS_NEPAHandbook_Final.pdf (hereafter “Supplemental Guidance”).
145. See id. at 1.
146. See Colburn, Addition by Subtraction, supra note 107 at 164 (arguing that CATX
determinations aggregated into a collection, searchable and available publicly, could offer benefits
to a range of analyses, especially those concentrated on matching reasoning to outcomes after the
fact); cf. CHRISTOPHER K. ANSELL, PRAGMATIST DEMOCRACY: EVOLUTIONARY LEARNING AS
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (2011) (uniting threads from “problem-solving” traditions and contemporary
positive political theory to describe a model in which public agencies are held accountable by their
active engagement of the public and by building consent for public policy as the true governmenton-the-ground).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970).
148. See Supplemental Guidance, supra note 144 at 1-3.
149. 43 C.F.R. § 46.100(b)(2) (1969) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.23 (1970).
150. 43 C.F.R. § 46.125 (1969).
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impacts. 151 Especially for the many NPS units in the massive Ninth and
Tenth Circuits, more attention to cumulative impacts in NPS NEPA
documents will inevitably follow from court orders. 152 NPS directs its
personnel to consider cumulative impacts in every EA/FONSI and
EIS. 153 Adequately weighing cumulative impacts remains one of
NEPA’s most elusive tasks, though, one that challenges agencies to
mount a concerted, long-term effort. 154 But what has NPS done to
facilitate the consideration of cumulative impacts, least of all at scales
where they can be weighed the most? Thus far, the answer is: not much.
Of course, expert review committees face challenges of their own, 155
much as the decentralized components of a larger, uncoordinated whole
do. 156 If NPS can optimize its unit/system impairment trade-offs through
its NEPA compliance choices, it will be by selecting the worst threats to
park system integrity overall, finding what can be done to mitigate those
threats nationally and regionally, and using unit-level and regional
operations to pursue those objectives. There is no single right track for
this kind of problem-oriented use of NEPA. But many wrong tracks have
151. On NPS’s anemic long-term monitoring programming, see Steven G. Fancy & Robert E.
Bennetts, Institutionalizing an Effective Long-term Monitoring Program in the U.S. National Park
Service, in DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF LONG-TERM ECOLOGICAL MONITORING STUDIES 481 (Robert
A. Gitzen et al. eds., 2012). When the Department of Interior adopted CEQ’s guidance permitting
the aggregation of past actions in any cumulative impact analysis in 2008, see 73 Fed. Reg. at
61298, it did so in part to leave individual bureaus the discretion needed to appraise cumulative
impact within their own budgets and institutional constraints. See id. (leaving the option of more
specific guidance being adopted into the Departmental Manual or individual bureau policies). But
NPS’s 2015 NEPA Handbook states only that “[a] cumulative impact analysis must consider the
overall effects of the direct and indirect impacts of the proposed action, when added to impacts of
past, present and reasonably foreseeable actions on a given resource.” NEPA HANDBOOK, supra
note 128 at 62. It further allows that “changes to the environment that are not attributable to specific
actions, such as general urban encroachment or population growth, should be addressed as part of
the affected environment.” Id. at 63.
152. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have made clear that they expect all “reasonably
foreseeable” cumulative impacts to be weighed in EA/FONSIs. See, e.g., Native Ecosystems
Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 895-96 (9th Cir. 2002); Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 11201122 (10th Cir. 2002).
153. See NEPA HANDBOOK, supra note 128 at 62-63.
154. See Colburn, Risk in Discretion, supra note 18 at 24-33, 46-48.
155. Cf. Bernard Grofman et al., Thirteen Theorems in Search of the Truth, 15 THEORY &
DECISION 261 (1983) (setting out over a dozen theories linking the accuracy of summary group
judgments to the competence of the group’s individual members); see also Christian List & Philip
Pettit, An Epistemic Free-Riding Problem?, in KARL POPPER: CRITICAL APPRAISALS 128, 136-40
(Philip Catton & Graham Macdonald eds., 2004) (arguing that group members have an powerful
incentive to “free ride” on others’ information in any group of experts asked to reach a collective
judgment and arguing that the incentive is correlated with group size).
156. See ANSELL, supra note 146 at 69-73 (rejecting the dualism of centralization versus
decentralization and finding that effective organizations use internal connections and networks to
bootstrap themselves into continuous improvement).
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already been identified.
In the Yellowstone fires of 1988 when over a third of the park
burned, some of it in high intensity, stand-replacing fires, NPS made a
decision to allow “nature” to take its course. But it did so after it had
suppressed nature—routine, relatively low intensity fires—for
decades. 157 Making matters worse for NPS had been Smokey Bear’s
long campaign to convince the American public of fire’s evils, leaving a
dissonance that, in the aftermath, bewitched the agency. 158 Wyoming
Senator Alan Simpson lashed out at NPS repeating inaccuracies and
outright falsehoods about the fires—which did virtually no lasting harm
to the park ecologically or as a tourism engine but did sour the
congressional delegation on NPS for a time. 159 A better approach to fire
and its management throughout Greater Yellowstone would be to collect
the fundamentally different alternatives in fire-adapted ecosystem
governance, to describe those alternatives for personnel to resolve into
operational terms, and to present those alternatives to the public for its
review and input. 160 The planning now required of NPS by statute 161
should be channeled into this kind of problem-oriented use of
programmatic (and site-focused) NEPA reviews which can
simultaneously prompt and engage stakeholders, investigate cumulative
human impacts on whole regions, and prepare the public for changes that
lie ahead. 162 Site-specific risks like a stand-replacing wildfire are
157. See John D. Varley & Paul Schullery, Reality and Opportunity in the Yellowstone Fires
of 1988, in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM: REDEFINING AMERICA’S WILDERNESS
HERITAGE 105, 115-119 (Robert B. Keiter & Mark S. Boyce eds., 1991).
158. Id. at 115-16 (finding that, despite a public outcry after the fires, the Greater Yellowstone
region quickly recovered from the 1988 fire season but that NPS faced a crippling backlash).
159. See Dennis Glick & Ben Alexander, Development by Default, Not Design: Yellowstone
National Park and the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, in NATIONAL PARKS AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT: PRACTICE AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 181, 189-195 (Gary E. Machlis &
Donald R. Field eds., 2000).
160. Compare ANSELL, supra note 146 at 75-81 (describing the elements of “responsive”
organizations, dependent upon their citizens’ inputs for their own character and competence, which
pursue the broadest goals like evolutionary learning by constantly reviewing program lines, budgets,
procurement, and personnel management), with USDA FOREST SERV., FINAL SIERRA-NEVADA BIOREGIONAL ASSESSMENT 31-52 (2013) (reviewing cumulative effects of fire suppression, resource
extraction, wildland-urban interface development, drought, and fire reintroduction throughout
Sierra-Nevada region in programmatic analysis supporting land management plan revisions for,
among other goals, fire resilience in region’s three national forests).
161. See 54 U.S.C. §§ 100502-100505 (2014) (requiring unit-level land management and
strategic plans).
162. A programmatic EIS that examined the cumulative effect of fire suppression and studied
the reasonable alternatives to its reintroduction throughout Greater Yellowstone would have passed
through U.S. EPA in its role as reviewer of essentially all EISs pursuant to Clean Air Act Section
309. EPA’s review guidance directs its personnel to “determine” whether the NEPA analysis has
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certainly worth planning for, but with agency resources at historically
low levels and more units to administer with every Presidential
Administration that goes by, it is the larger, more integrative exercises in
risk planning to which true leadership must attend. 163
Some shifts, like assisted migration/transplantation 164 and fire
management, 165 are highly salient politically. They quickly draw out
engaged stakeholders and the information that flows from an active
public dialogue. But many more issues lack ready solutions grounded in
science or even careful modeling and are not assured any public salience
to change that. And in real terms, resources have been dwindling
steadily for decades. 166 This is where a “recursive” organization that
actively shapes its personnel and routines around the organizing
challenges of the world-at-large can make the biggest difference.167
NEPA routines intentionally scaled to fit both the most important
cumulative environmental impacts and NPS decision-makers’ practical
needs should be entitled to judicial deference across all the pertinent
identified the resources and ecosystems components cumulatively impacted” and whether “these
effects have been historically significant for this resource.” U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, CONSIDERATION OF CUMULATIVE IMPACTS IN EPA REVIEW OF NEPA DOCUMENTS 5
(May 1999) (EPA 315-R-99-002) (emphasis added). It goes on to direct that EPA’s reviewers
“should determine whether the NEPA analysis has used geographic and time boundaries large
enough to include all potentially significant effects on the resources of concern.” Id. at 8. Finally,
EPA instructs that “current condition typically may not adequately represent how actions have
impacted resources in the past and present or how resources might respond to future impacts.
Designating existing environmental conditions as a benchmark may focus the environmental impact
assessment too narrowly . . . .” Id. at 14. Although these are clearly very flexible—and subjective—
directions EPA at least has here instructed its personnel to take cumulative impact analysis, separate
from the designation of “baseline” conditions, very seriously.
163. NPS must create a “[g]eneral management plan for the preservation and use” of every
NPS unit, 54 U.S.C. § 100502 (2014), and its 2006 Management Policies assure that planning is to
be “interdisciplinary and tiered.” 2006 MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 19 at § 2.1.2. Indeed,
NPS policies maintain that park planning includes no fewer than five different levels of plans, not
including the “foundation statement” for each unit’s planning outputs, see id. at §§ 2.2-2.3, yet
remains wholly noncommittal as to when or where different kinds of NEPA reviews are best
prepared.
164. See Jason S. MacLachlan et al., A Framework for Debate of Assisted Migration in an Era
of Climate Change, 21 CON. BIO. 297, 297-98 (2007).
165. See A.L. Westerling et al., Warming and Earlier Spring Increase Western U.S. Forest
Wildfire Activity, 313 SCIENCE 940, 943 (2006).
166. See, e.g., Emily Yehle, Park Service Grapples with “Frustrated” Workforce,
GREENWIRE (May 31, 2016), available at www.eenews.net/greenwire (“Almost $12 billion in
deferred maintenance is spread throughout the Park Service’s 411 units, leaving a growing to-do list
that grinds down once-proud employees.”).
167. Cf. ANSELL, supra note 146 at 104-05 (defining recursiveness as a continuous and
interlocking cycle of perspectives and a recursive organization as one that resolves the tension
between centralization and decentralization by circularly integrating its different hierarchies and
feeding real-time information throughout).
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standards of review. 168 But they can also unite stakeholders behind park
management decisions. Additionally, NPS units have had the occasional
success in using a NEPA routine to bring together diverse stakeholders
behind dramatic changes in management priorities. 169
What is needed for the agency’s second century is guidance that
seizes the many interwoven threads of the problem and spins them into a
coherent tapestry. Broad-scale re-analysis of decision files from nonimpairment/NEPA findings is one vital step. Better distributing the
informational burdens of non-impairment/NEPA work as between broad
and small scale decision-making is another. 170 Careful quantitative
inventorying of cumulative effects may be a third.171 Is there any broader
theme, though?
To business strategists, disruptive innovation’s key facets are not
technological, they are economic. 172 Disruptive innovations are possible
in two places that most incumbents ignore. First, what are known as lowend footholds. Where incumbents typically try to provide everimproving products and services, they often ignore less-demanding
customers and overshoot the latter’s performance requirements. That
opens the door to someone looking to supply these low-end customers
with a “good enough” product. Second are new-market footholds. Here,
disrupters create a market where none existed by turning non-consumers
into consumers. 173 In neither are the upstarts outcompeting the
incumbent (whose advantages are too great). They are learning, taking
clues from successful markets and creating another. This could be a
lesson to NPS as it looks for ways to answer the calls for
“accountability” from NEPA plaintiffs and/or the public, to knit nonimpairment together with the ecological sciences, to sustain local
communities that have grown dependent on access to the parks, and to

168. Cf. League of Wilderness Defs. v. Allen, 615 F.3d 1122, 1135-38 (9th Cir. Or. 2010)
(deferring to Service’s use of cumulative impact analysis in a programmatic EIS from which it
would tier smaller, site-specific actions still to be planned); Native Ecosystems Council v.
Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 895-97 (9th Cir. 2002) (overturning EA/FONSI prepared in connection
with timber sales for failure to aggregate the cumulative effect of the logging projects, “even though
distantly spaced throughout the forest”).
169. See, e.g., ENVTL. LAW INST., NEPA SUCCESS STORIES: CELEBRATING 40 YEARS OF
TRANSPARENCY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT 23-24 (2010) (recounting Hells Canyon National
Recreation Area’s use of EIS process to forge agreement between grazing, tribal, recreationist and
preservationist stakeholders in shift toward “natural ecosystem” approach to region).
170. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 106-28 and accompanying text.
172. See Clayton M. Christensen et al., What Is Disruptive Innovation? HARV. BUS. REV. 44
(Dec. 2015).
173. See id. at 45-47.
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do it all with a diminishing resource base. Disruptive innovation by NPS
would anticipate all of these calls upon its resources, anticipate the most
likely threats to park unit and system integrity in our climate-disrupted
future, and start assembling the teams of people to address them
intentionally and with focus. That sort of learning-by-doing is about the
only option NPS has left.
An information economist at NPS looking ahead to its second
century would conclude that the information it needs to do those jobs is
too costly and too scarce to be obtained routinely (at least with current
technology) and that, in any event, actual markets have a way of
working even without people knowing what they know or being able to
communicate it. Real markets are thought to work because prices act as
a proxy for what buyers and sellers really want. And although NPS may
have no such proxy for solving its problems, it does have the power to
create buffers for itself and avoid wasting resources pursuing
information it cannot obtain. As in the 2006 Management Policies’
creation of “unacceptable impacts,” 174 NPS can better structure its
decision-making to take full advantage of proof burdens, the default
settings in cases where proof burdens remain unmet, and the affected
public’s incentives to produce needed information bearing on NPS
judgments. Creating prohibitory access norms that apply until adequate
proof permits a finding of acceptable impacts is but one example. The
legal imagination could easily derive others.175
V. CONCLUSION
In an age of disruption, maintaining fragments of our natural world
and national heritage undiminished for future generations is becoming a
devilishly complex task. NEPA could play a vital role in steering the
cultural and institutional inertia of NPS while at the same time
addressing two challenging statutory mandates. Given their natures,
these two mandates promise to continue intertwining with each other and
producing yet unknown legal duties for NPS. Fulfilling them will require
NPS to get ahead of the informational and organizational challenges they
bring, which may mean thinking like the disruptive innovator. Almost
every disruptive innovation begins as a small-scale experiment, and
therefore no one should expect NPS to accomplish the agenda described
174. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
175. Our legal tradition’s basic response to uncertainty and information costs has taken this
form for a very long time. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Legal Powers, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM:
JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 194 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1982).
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here overnight. But NPS management must take the lead in spurring and
supporting more experiments. If they do not, the informational and
organizational burdens swelling behind the non-impairment/NEPA
trends promise to fill its second century with distress.
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